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Abstract
We offer a unified framework to analyze the determination of employment,
employee effort, wages, profit sharing and capital structure when firms face
stochastic revenue shocks. We apply a generalized Nash bargaining solution,
which extends the wage bargaining literature by incorporating efficiency wage
considerations, profit sharing and capital structure. The profit sharing instrument
is demonstrated to have positive effort-augmenting and wage-moderating effects,
which exactly offset the negative dilution effect in equilibrium. Leverage is shown
to reduce employment and to have a strategic commitment value as a wage-
moderating mechanism for firms facing unions in bilateral wage negotiations.
Finally, some implications for equilibrium unemployment are discussed.
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Pääomarakenne, palkkaneuvottelut ja työllisyys
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Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Tutkimuksessa esitetään yhtenäinen analyysikehikko, jonka avulla voidaan tutkia,
miten työllisyys, työntekijöiden työponnistukset, palkkataso, tulospalkkauksen
käyttö ja yritysten velkaantumisaste määräytyvät, kun yritykset kohtaavat satun-
naisia tulosokkeja. Tavanomaista Nash-palkkaneuvottelumallia laajennetaan tutki-
muksessa siten, että se kattaa tehokkuuspalkkanäkökohdat, yrityksen pääomara-
kenteen ja tulospalkkauksen mahdollisuuden. Tulospalkkauksen osoitetaan lisää-
vän työnteon kannustimia ja alentavan palkkatasoa. Yritysten velkaantumisella
puolestaan on työllisyyttä heikentävä vaikutus, ja velkaantuneisuus on myös stra-
teginen, palkkamalttia lisäävä väline. Lopuksi mallin avulla luonnehditaan tasa-
painotyöttömyyteen vaikuttavia tekijöitä.
Asiasanat: palkkaneuvottelut, tulospalkkaus, pääomarakenne, työllisyys
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1 Introduction
In Europe the unemployment rate has shown a rising trend during the last twenty
five years. This has raised the question of how to explain this development.
Without going explicitly into that issue, which is still partly unresolved, one
should notice that at the moment there are at least three important theoretical
approaches to study the determination of unemployment, namely efficiency wage
theories, search and matching theories and theories of union bargaining. Here we
take the view that these different types of theories are complementary. In Europe
various versions of the union bargaining theory have been quite popular. This is
natural as in most European countries over three quarters of the workforce have
earned wages that are covered by collective bargaining.
The most popular approach within the class of union bargaining theories has
been “right-to-manage” models (see e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991)).
According to this type of models trade unions and employer organizations bargain
over wages and subsequently firms unilaterally choose the employment level in
order to maximize their profits (see Oswald (1985) and Creedy and McDonald
(1991) for complementary surveys of various union bargaining approaches).
In the basic versions of union bargaining theories it is assumed that the supply
of working hours and effort of the members of the trade union are exogenously
given. Contrary to this, the main idea behind theories of efficiency wages is that
for various reasons the wage is not only a cost factor to the firm, but it also serves
as an incentive device (Akerlof and Yellen (1986) provide a selection of some
seminal articles on efficiency wages). Usually, union bargaining and efficiency
wage theories have been analyzed separately in the literature. But to the extent
that it is not possible to monitor the effort by workers, the outcome generated
through wage bargaining may be affected by effort provision by workers and vice
versa. The interactions between wage bargaining and efficiency wage
considerations are analyzed in Lindbeck and Snower (1991), Sanfey (1993),
Bulkley and Myles (1996) and  Altenburg and Straub (1999).
Profit sharing mechanisms represent an incentive device, which has been
proposed and studied recently. Profit sharing refers to remuneration mechanisms
where the traditional fixed-wage remuneration is replaced by a scheme with a
fixed base wage plus a share of profits or revenues of firms. Weitzman (1985)
argues that the profit sharing system leads to better business cycle performance
when compared to a fixed wage system and conjectures that profit sharing
systems will reduce equilibrium unemployment (Weitzman (1987)). This intuition
is formally developed by Holmlund (1991), who asks whether the profit sharing
system actually leads to wage moderation and thereby to higher employment. He
emphasizes that profit sharing provides an incentive for lower base wages and
higher employment. However, the outside opportunities of workers will also
increase which, in turn, will strengthen the union’s bargaining position by
increasing its threat point. As a general equilibrium phenomenon the
consequences for employment of introducing profit sharing depend on the precise
properties of the production function. In a model with capital stock decisions
incorporated Jerger and Michaelis (1999) develop this approach further and also
show that a switch from a fixed wage economy to a share economy results in
lower aggregate unemployment. A different argument for profit sharing is
presented by Pohjola (1987) and by Anderson and Devereux (1989). They argue8
that profit-sharing may be a necessary part of an efficient contract when the
union-firm bargaining is constrained by the assumption that total employment is
unilaterally determined by the firm so that wage and employment determination is
inefficient in the absence of profit sharing.
The theories of unemployment mentioned thus far have all abstracted from
financial considerations by exploring the role of wages as factor costs or by
focusing on the incentive effects associated with wages. There is currently,
however, a fair amount of empirical evidence from several countries suggesting
that the real interest rate and the firm’s leverage (or share of debt financing) will
have a negative effect on employment (see e.g. Sharpe (1994), Hanka (1999),
Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and Funke, Maurer and Strulik (1999)). Theoretical
models of employment determination should be able to also explain the
mechanisms behind these findings.
The potential role of financial factors in employment determination raises
questions regarding the implications of financial factors more generally. Do
financial factors affect the wage determination and, if so, how will these effects
influence the optimal capital structure of the firms? In their comprehensive survey
of capital structure theories Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that “capital structure
models based on product/input market interactions are in their infancy” (p. 319).
Since then an emerging literature has focused on the interaction between
corporate finance, wage and employment policies. Bronars and Deere (1991) as
well as Perotti and Spier (1993) demonstrate how firms can use debt as a strategic
instrument to reduce the costs that unionized workers can impose on shareholders
through their collective bargaining power. Bronars and Deere (1991) also present
empirical evidence from U.S. industries of financial leverage being an increasing
function of the probability of union formation. They argue that this is consistent
with the view that debt offers strategic advantages to shareholders in the context
of bilateral bargaining with workers.
In a different vein Garvey and Gaston (1998) introduce a strategic role of debt
into a simple version of an efficiency wage model. In the framework of a
theoretical model they show that employers for whom firm-specific human capital
investments are important to profits will choose low debt-equity ratios, thereby
committing themselves to a relatively “soft” bargaining position in order to
encourage efficiency-enhancing activities by workers. Also Dasgupta and
Sengupta (1993) investigate the role of capital structure as a strategic instrument
designed to affect the outcome of bilateral bargaining with workers or other input
suppliers. In their model debt is chosen so as to balance the bargaining advantage
of debt against its agency costs (due to moral hazard) and debt is an optimal
financial instrument only when it can provide a bargaining advantage for the firm.
Finally, Sarig (1998) studies the effect of leverage on shareholder-union
bargaining. He shows that leverage may affect shareholders’ bargaining position
vis-à-vis their employees by affecting the shareholders’ threat point within the
framework of Nash bargaining. Sarig, however, takes the existence and extent of
debt financing as given and demonstrates that the union’s expected wage
increases with the leverage of the firm. This is due to Sarig’s assumption that with
higher leverage a disagreement increases shareholders’ risk of bankruptcy and
makes the shareholders ‘softer’ in wage negotiations.
We can conclude our literature review by observing that several papers have
focused on the impact of financial factors on wage bargaining, but with mixed
results. At the moment there is no unified framework to simultaneously deal with9
the determination of wages, employment, employee effort, profit sharing and the
choice of capital structure by firms. The purpose of this paper is to carry out
precisely such an analysis by starting from the notion that decisions take place in
an environment where firms face uncertainty, and thereby risk of bankruptcy.
Prior to the stage of wage negotiations, and in anticipation of the outcome of this
bargaining process, firms strategically commit themselves to profit-sharing
schemes and capital structure. Subsequently firms unilaterally make the
employment decisions.
Our analysis shows that employment depends negatively on the effective
labour cost as well as on the hazard rate capturing the uncertainty associated with
the survival and continuation of the firm’s production. The effective labour cost
consists not only of the wage rate, but it also incorporates the interest rate and,
importantly, the firm’s leverage rate. Further, the effort provision by employees is
shown to depend positively not only on the usual efficiency wage considerations,
but also on the effort-enhancing effects of profit sharing. We offer a generalized
Nash bargaining solution, which both unifies and generalizes the wage bargaining
literature by incorporating not only the efficiency wage considerations extended to
capture uncertainty, but also profit sharing and capital structure. The generalized
bargaining solution exhibits how performance-based evaluation in the form of
profit sharing and capital structure will to have a strategic wage-moderating
commitment value for a firm facing a union in wage negotiations. Finally, we
derive the optimal profit sharing system and the optimal capital structure from the
firm’s point of view. The profit sharing instrument is demonstrated to have
positive effort-augmenting and wage-moderating effects, which exactly offset the
negative dilution effect at the optimum. We also establish the mechanism whereby
a higher leverage rate will not only increase the effective labour cost, but also
moderate the wage rate. This latter mechanism represents a crucial effect
determining the firm’s optimal capital structure.
We proceed as follows. In section II we present the basic structure of the
model as well as the time sequence of decisions under circumstances where a firm
operates in an environment characterized by uncertainty and thereby risk of
bankruptcy. The determination of effort by employees and the employment
decisions by firms are studied in section III. In section IV we investigate the wage
determination in the presence of efficiency wage considerations and under the
assumption that firms unilaterally determine employment. Conditional on the
firm’s commitments to a profit-sharing system and a capital structure we derive a
generalized Nash bargaining solution. In section V we characterize the optimal
combination of profit-sharing and capital structure from the firm’s point of view.
In section VI we ask: What difference does it make that the firm commits itself to
a profit sharing system relative to a situation where the profit share would be
determined at the bargaining stage simultaneously with the wage rate? Section VII
outlines the implications of profit sharing, union bargaining power, leverage and
the benefit-replacement ratio on aggregate unemployment within a general
equilibrium framework. Finally, concluding comments as well as suggestions for
further research are presented in section VIII.10
2 Basic structure of the model
We consider a firm operating in an environment characterized by uncertainty.
Production requires the firm to employ homogenous workers within the
framework of a unionized labor market. In conformity with the efficiency wage
hypothesis we assume that the output of the firm depends not only on the number
of workers employed, but also on the effort offered by each worker. By
employing L units of labor, each providing effort denoted by a the stochastic
revenues accruing to the firm are given by
), L , a ( R q (2.1)
where q denotes a random revenue shock with a cumulative distribution function
F(q), and an associated density function f(q). The support of this probability
distribution is assumed to be [0,q ] with q £  ¥. We can offer several
interpretations of the random shock q. It could, depending on the context, capture
a technology, an output or a price shock. Further we assume that the production
function R(a,L) satisifies the following conventional conditions: Ra > 0, Raa < 0,
RL > 0, RLL < 0 and RaL > 0. Thus, the production function is an increasing and
concave function of both the production factors, and the two production factors
exhibit complementarity.
In the long run, the firm commits itself to a capital structure determining how
its production will be financed as well as to the form of the wage contract
determining to what extent profit sharing will be utilized. The profit share, t,
determines what fraction of the firm’s profits is transferred to employed workers
as part of the contract. Conditional on the capital structure as well as the structure
of compensation to organized labour the firm and the trade union engage in wage
bargaining. At the stage of firm-union negotiations the firm and the union engage
in traditional Nash bargaining regarding the base wage, w, to be paid to all the
workers employed by the firm. We pay particular attention to characterizations of
how the firm’s leverage and profit sharing will impact on the negotiated wage.
Conditional on the negotiated wage contract the firm and the trade union both
make optimizing decisions. The firm unilaterally determines the employment
level once the conditions of the wage negotiations have been settled. In line with
the tradition of efficiency-wage models, the wage contracts cannot be made
contingent on the effort provision of workers, because effort is unobservable to
the firm. Thus, the representative union member decides on effort so as to
maximize his objective function, which takes into account that effort provision
causes disutility. As the union is formed by homogenous agents and as intra-
organizational agency issues within the union are outside the scope of our
analysis, the union is assumed to be able to enforce the effort provision by the
representative union member so as to eliminate the potential free rider problems.
1
At the stage of wage negotiations the employer holds rational expectations
regarding how the outcome of the bargaining will impact on the effort incentives
                                                
1 If we were to apply an alternative formulation where individual efforts were not directly
observable and workers were heterogenous, group punishment or reward schemes would have to
be used for enforcement (see e.g. Holmström (1982)).11
of the individual union member. These incentives depend on the base wage as
well as on the profit share.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the effort incentives of individual
union members are affected not only by the wage negotiations, but also by the
firm’s capital structure. If a debt-financed firm is bankrupt, the employment
relationship will not survive. In such a case the unemployed worker will receive
the unemployment benefit, b, which is assumed to be exogenously given and
financed by the government.
We summarize the timing of the decisions made by the firm, the union and the
representative union member in Figure 1. In the subsequent sections we turn to a
more detailed analysis of the decisions taking place at the different stages of the
firm-union interaction. We use backward induction and solve the game in reverse





















3 Determination of employment and effort
At this stage we assume that the firm has irreversibly committed itself to a capital
structure whereby the fraction d (0 £ d £ 1) of the firm’s production expenses are
covered by debt. We consider a standard debt contract exhibiting limited liability
and characterized by an interest rate, r. This implies that the effective labour cost
can be expressed by (1–d)wL + dwL(1+r) = w(1+dr)L, thereby exhibiting its
dependence on capital structure. Further, we assume that the wage negotiations
have generated a wage contract with a wage w and that the firm has decided to
apply the profit share t.
Under these circumstances the firm decides on employment L so as to
maximize the expected profits
, d ) ( f ) L ) r 1 ( w ) L , a ( R ( ) L , a ( E
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denotes the “break-even” state of nature such that the firm remains solvent for
q ³ q ˆ , while there is bankruptcy when  q < q ˆ . We can infer that the firm’s
employment decision as well as the employee’s effort provision will impact on q ˆ ,
and thereby on the probability of bankruptcy, F(q ˆ ). Differentiating (3.2) with
respect to a and L, respectively, we can conclude that
0
) L , a ( R
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q
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Consequently, an increase in effort (employment) will shift the break-even state of
nature towards lower (higher) levels meaning that increased effort (employment)
will decrease (increase) the probability of bankruptcy. (3.2a) demonstrates a
threat-of-liquidation effect, which forms an element of effort-enhancing
implications of debt.
Conditional on the negotiated wage contract the representative employed
union member makes the effort decision in order to maximize the expected rent
[] () ), a ( g d ) ( f L ) r 1 ( w ) L , a ( R
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where the increasing and convex function g(a) is a monetary representation of the
disutility of effort. With probability F(q ˆ ) the firm goes bankrupt and the worker is
unemployed receiving the unemployment benefit b. With the complementary
probability, 1–F(q ˆ ), the firm remains solvent and the employed union member is
remunerated according to the compensation contract, i.e. the sum of the base
wage, w, negotiated with the employer, and the share, t/L, of the profit
realization, determined by the employer.
The formulations (3.2) and (3.3) incorporate an important qualitative, and
empirically relevant, difference between the base wage w and the performance-
based profit share t. The fact that w is part of the definition of q ˆ  captures the
commonly observed feature that wages represent senior claims relative to those of
debtholders, while the performance-related profit share represents a contractual
claim, which is junior relative to that of debtholders.
The optimal combination of employment and effort provision is determined
by the system of first-order conditions
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According to condition (3.4) the firm chooses the employment level so as to
equalize the expected marginal return from labour (the term qRL(a,L)) to the
effective wage cost (the term w(1+rd)), which is adjusted to take account of
limited liability whereby the firm will bear the production costs only in solvent
states of nature.
Equation (3.5) characterizes the determination of effort by a representative
employee so as to equalize the marginal benefit (the LHS terms) to the marginal
disutility of effort (the RHS term). The first term on the LHS describes the effect
of effort on the break-even state of nature, above which the firm remains solvent.
Since higher effort decreases q ˆ  and thereby decreases the probability that the
employee becomes unemployed, it will represent a positive marginal benefit by
increasing the probability that an employee gets the rent w-b from the base wage
as well as the share, t/L, of the profit realization. The second term on the LHS in
(3.5) captures the higher marginal product of increased effort provision adjusted
to the probability of bankruptcy.
In order to simplify our analysis so as to make it possible to highlight the
economic mechanisms involved as transparently as possible we make the
following three assumptions regarding the functional forms of the production
technology, the probability distribution of random revenue shocks and the
disutility of employee effort.









The parameter a is restricted to satisfy 0 < a < 1 so that specification (R1) can be
thought of as a well-defined concave production function exhibiting decreasing
returns to scale with effort and employment separated as production factors,
between which complementarity prevails. We assume, following Solow (1978),
that labour and effort enter the production function multiplicatively so that the
parameter a captures the productivity of each of the two production factors.
2





                                                
2 For our purposes the assumption of equalizing the productivity of the two production factors
incorporates no loss of generality as it can be achieved through an appropriate selection of
measurement units with respect to these production factors.14
In our context the Poisson distribution is particularly appealing, because it implies
a constant hazard ratio defined by l = f(q ˆ )/(1–F(q ˆ )).




Assumption G means that we consider a class of functions with the property that
the distility of effort can be captured through an increasing and convex
relationship with constant elasticity.
From now on we assume these functional form assumptions, R, F and G, to
hold. Under such circumstances the equilibrium condition (3.4) with respect to the







According to equation (3.6) the optimal employment decision will imply a
constant probability of bankruptcy F(q ˆ ) = 1–e
–l q ˆ
, which depends positively on
the parameter a of the production function. It is remarkable that the Poisson
process (Assumption F) induces the firm to adjust employment so as to keep the
probability of bankruptcy constant irrespectively of the underlying uncertainty, l,
incorporated in this probability distribution. By combination of (R1), (3.2) and
(3.6) we can conclude that the optimal employment has to satisfy
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where h = (1–a)
–1 is the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the effective
labour cost  w ~ = w(1+d). As 0< a <1, we know that h > 1. In particular, from (3.7)
we can conclude that the labor demand will exhibit constant elasticity with respect
to effective wage costs – a feature which turns out to be analytically convenient at
subsequent stages of our analysis.
Substituting the production function (R1) as well as Assumptions F and G















where the probability of solvency k = 1–F(q ˆ ) = 
q l - ˆ
e  is constant by (3.6).
Substituting the RHS of (3.7) for L into this equation shows that the optimal effort
provision can be explicitly expressed as
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t . We can directly see that Cw
and Ct are both positive.
We can summarize our characterization of the optimal combination of
employment and effort provision according to the following proposition.
3URSRVLWLRQ 7KH HTXLOLEULXP FRQILJXUDWLRQ RI  HPSOR\PHQW DQG
HIIRUWSURYLVLRQLVJLYHQE\DQG
According to equation (3.7) employment depends negatively on the effective
labour cost as well as on the hazard rate capturing the uncertainty associated with
the continuation of the firm’s production. The effective labour cost consists not
only of the wage rate, but also of the interest rate and the fraction, d, of the firm’s
production expenses covered by debt (the leverage rate). Equation (3.7) thereby
suggests that the higher is the firm’s leverage rate, the lower is employment,
ceteris paribus. In fact, empirical evidence from USA (see e.g. Sharpe (1994) and
Hanka (1998)), from UK (see e.g. Nickell and Wadhwani (1991) and Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1999) as well as from Germany (see e.g. Funke, Maurer and Strulik
(1999)) lies in conformity with the prediction that the firm’s leverage will have a
negative effect on employment. Further, we can conclude that employment
depends positively on the effort chosen by the employees.
According to equation (3.8) the effort by a representative employee depends
positively both on the difference between the basic wage rate and the
unemployment benefit and on the magnitude of profit sharing. The former
characteristic is a typical feature of the effort function used in the context of the
efficiency wage hypothesis. The latter characteristic reminds of a positive
relationship between the effort provision and the intensity of incentives in the
sense of the principal-agent literature. However, in the context of wage bargaining
between firms and unions possessing market power this feature has not previously
been analyzed in the literature.
3
Finally, for a given combination of the base wage and the profit share a rise in
the firm’s survival probability enhances effort provision () 0 a
*
k > . In principle, an
increase in the bankruptcy probability can be thought to have two effects affecting
effort provision in opposite directions (see e.g. in Schmidt (1997)). An increase in
the bankruptcy probability induces a threat-of-liquidation effect, which enhances
effort. On the other hand, it reduces the firm’s profits, which makes it less
attractive to offer effort in the presence of profit sharing. In our model the latter
effect dominates.
                                                
3 There is a recent literature, which studies the relationship between profit sharing, wage
bargaining and unemployment under various bargaining structures (see Pohjola (1987), Anderson
and Devereux (1989), Holmlund (1990), and Jerger and Michaelis (1999)). This literature, on
which we will comment in a more detailed way later on in section VI, has been restricted to
deterministic models where profit shares are determined as a result of bargaining simultaneously
with the base wage. Moreover, this literature has not considered the natural case where effort by an
employee may be affected by a commitment to profit sharing.16
4 Nash bargaining and wage structure
We now turn to analyze the wage negotiations between a union and a firm both
posessing market power with respect to the wage determination. For this purpose
we apply the Nash bargaining solution and make use of the “right-to-manage”
approach according to which employment is unilaterally determined by the firm.
Effort provision takes place at the discretion of the employees. Finally, the wage
negotiations are assumed to take place conditional on the firm having committed
itself both to a capital structure incorporating some degree of debt finance as well
as to a system of profit sharing as an incentive scheme offered to the unionized
employees.
We denote the relative bargaining power of the union by b, and, consequently,
that of the firm by (1–b). In line with (3.3) the objective function of the trade
union can be written as
, b ) L N ( ) a ( g E
L













+ q - + q =
where the first term captures the employed and the second term the unemployed
union members. We assume that the threat points of the union and the firm can be
described by EU
0 = Nb – Lg(a*) and Ep
0 = 0, respectively. It should be
emphasized that the threat point of the union differs from the standard one in so
far as it incorporates the disutility of effort by employed union members.
Applying the traditional Nash bargaining solution the negotiating parties decide
on w in order to maximize
[] [ ]
b - b p t - = W
1 E ) 1 ( EU (4.1)
subject to the conditions described by the labour demand equation (3.7) and the
effort determination (3.8) and with EU = EÛ – EU
0.
In the Nash bargaining product (4.1), Ep = Ep(a*, L*) denotes the expected
profit of the firm and it is adjusted with the factor (1–t) in order to take the impact
of profit sharing into account. The factor EU = EU(a*, L*) denotes the expected
rent of the union relative to the threat point. The expected profits and the expected
rent of the union are evaluated at the equilibrium combination of effort and
employment to capture that the wage negotiations take place in anticipation of
optimal behavior with respect to these variables.
The calculation of the union’s expected rent captures the idea that all the N
workers have incentives to seek employment. Those union members who are left
unemployed, either due to the magnitude of the firm’s production or due to
bankruptcy, enjoy the unemployment benefit b. Thus the expected rent of the
union, EU, is
[] , *) L *, a ( E ) b w ( * L )) ˆ ( F 1 ( *) L *, a ( EU EU p t + - q - = = (4.2)
where the term L*(w–b) represents the employment part and the term tEp(a*, L*)
the profit-sharing part.17
Further, in anticipation of the equilibrium with respect to effort provision and
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or, alternatively, by
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 In order to guarantee the
expected profit of the firm to be positive we formally make
$VVXPSWLRQ& 7KH SDUDPHWHU F GHILQHG DERYH LV DVVXPHG WR EH VWULFWO\
SRVLWLYH
To simplify the notation, from now on we will refer to the equilibrium values of
effort and employment by (a, L) without superscripts.
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where the subscript w denotes differentiation with respect to the wage rate w.
5
According to equation (4.4) the Nash bargaining wage rate is affected by the
relative bargaining power of the union, b, and the firm, 1–b, respectively, as well
as by the relative effect of the wage rate on the objective functions of the
negotiating agents, i.e. the terms EUw/EU and Epw/Ep.
For the first-order condition (4.4) to have an interior solution for 0 < b < 1 it




w = x  satisfies the inequality xw < 1. As Appendix A makes clear, under this
assumption the proportional marginal change in the expected profits of the firm
from increasing the wage rate is negative, while the corresponding proportional
marginal change in the expected rent of the union is positive. Both these
properties are very natural and therefore the Nash bargaining solution has the
intuitively appealing feature that the negotiated wage rate is an increasing
function of the union’s bargaining power, b. By substituting the ratios (A1.1) and
(A1.4), derived in Appendix 1, into (4.4) we find the Nash bargaining solution,
w
N, to satisfy the following implicit form
                                                
4 This can be obtained by substituting the optimal employment decision by the firm for L in the
expected profit function (4.3).
5 We assume that the sufficient second-order condition for the the Nash bargaining solution
[]() [] 0 E E E
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w - = h  denotes the total wage elasticity of labour demand
incorporating both the direct effect and the indirect effect of the wage rate via
effort provision on labour demand. The elasticity of effort with respect to wage
can be explicitly calculated to be
. 0
bC )) r 1 ( C C ( w
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Further it is straightforward from equation (3.7) to see that the total elasticity of
labour demand h* is associated with the conventional labour demand elasticity h
and the elasticity of effort according to the following relationship
). 1 ( * w - h x + h = h (4.7)







SURILW VKDUH RI WKH OHYHUDJH UDWH DQG RI WKH LQWHUHVW UDWH DV ZHOO DV DQ
LQFUHDVLQJIXQFWLRQRIWKHXQHPSOR\PHQWEHQHILW
We can generally observe from the Nash bargaining solution (4.5) that most of the
exogenous parameters affect the negotiated wage rate both directly and indirectly
by changing the effort elasticity and thereby the total wage elasticity of labour
demand. Further, in contrast to the standard result in union bargaining models, the
negotiated wage rate exhibits a non-linear positive relationship with the
unemployment benefit. Using Lemma 1 we can identity three channels through
which a change in the unemployment benefit will affect the wage rate. The direct
effect is positive in reflection of the fact that w
N is proportional to b in the absence
of efficiency wage considerations. Further, an increase in b raises the effort
elasticity and, consequently, this indirect effect reinforces the direct one and
introduces non-linearity between w
N and b. Finally, the total elasticity of labour
demand will increase which in turn has a negative effect on the wage rate.
The wage rate negotiated through the Nash bargaining process is affected by
the interest rate, the profit share as well as the leverage rate again via three
channels described in Lemma 1. Firstly, all these variables have negative direct
effects on the wage rate in (4.5). Secondly, they all affect the negotiated wage rate
indirectly by changing both the effort elasticity xw and the total wage elasticity of
labour demand h*. The former effect reinforces the direct effect, while the latter
effect runs counter to it.19
We make the natural assumption that the direct effect of parameters dominate
the indirect effects taking place via induced changes in the effort elasticity and
thereby in the generalized elasticity of labour demand. Formally, this means that
we have  0
r
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d t ¶  respectively. We can summarize our analysis according to
3URSRVLWLRQ 7KH1DVKEDUJDLQLQJZDJHLVJLYHQLPSOLFLWO\E\7KLV
1DVK EDUJDLQLQJ VROXWLRQ H[KLELWV WKDW WKH LQWHUHVW UDWH WKH
SURILW VKDUH DV ZHOO DV WKH OHYHUDJH UDWH ZLOO KDYH ZDJH
PRGHUDWLQJ HIIHFWV ZKLOH WKH XQHPSOR\PHQW EHQHILW KDV D
ZDJHLQFUHDVLQJHIIHFW
As Proposition 2 makes clear, the incentive schemes in the form of profit-sharing
programs as well as capital structure both serve as strategic instruments whereby
the firm can induce wage moderation to take place at a subsequent stage of wage
bargaining.
The Nash bargaining solution (4.5) both unifies and generalizes the wage
bargaining literature, which has analyzed the wage determination in a static
framework with very limited attention attached to efficiency wage considerations,
capital structure and profit sharing. Our analysis with the Nash bargaining
solution (4.5) simultaneously includes efficiency wage considerations like in
Altenburg and Straub (1999), Bulkley and Myles (1996), Lindbeck and Snower
(1991) and Sanfey (1993), the price of capital like in Koskela, Schöb and Sinn
(1998), the effect of profit sharing on the wage rate like in Holmlund (1991) and
the effect of the firm’s leverage like in Bronars and Deere (1991), Garvey and
Gaston (1998), Perotti and Spier (1993) and Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993)).
The magnitude of xw captures how sensitive the effort provision is to changes
in the wage. We can see that the negotiated Nash wage is higher the larger is xw.
Thus, the more important are the efficiency wage considerations, the higher is the
negotiated Nash wage relative to the outside option covered by the unemployment
benefit. Therefore the union-wage bargaining and efficiency wage motives
reinforce each other.
6
The generalized Nash bargaining solution (4.5) implies several interesting
special cases against which it can be compared relative to existing knowledge
from the literature. We now turn to consider these special cases.
Firstly, in the absence of efficiency wage considerations we can reformulate
(4.5) according to
                                                
6 Lindbeck and Snower (1991) as well as Sanfey (1993) have studied the question of whether the
effieciency wage and insider-outsider theories of wage formation reinforce or weaken one another.
While Lindbeck and Snower argues that that sensitivity of the negotiated wage in insider power
decreases with higher efficiency wage incentives, Sanfey provides a model where the reverse
happens. In a different vein, Bulkley and Myles (1996) have used a monopoly union model to
study the effect of union power on the effort level under alternative assumptions concerning effort
monitoring. They conclude that a union will set a wage which increases the level of effort relative
to that which would be observed in a competitive labour market. Altenburg and Straub (1999)
have integrated union-firm bargaining into an efficiency wage model with imperfect monitoring of
worker performance.20
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which, in line with conventional union bargaining theories, exhibits a linear
relationship between the negotiated wage and the unemployment benefit. From
(4.8) we can conclude that profit sharing, interest rate, leverage and solvency will
all have a wage-moderating effect. Such features are absent from the conventional
Nash bargaining solution.
Secondly, if all the bargaining power lies with the union (b=1), the Nash
bargaining solution is simplified to the monopoly union solution
, b
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In particular, (4.9) demonstrates explicitly how efficiency wage considerations
and profit sharing impact on the optimal wage setting of a monopoly union. From
(4.9) we can conclude that profit sharing will reduce the optimal wage rate of a
monopoly union, while efficiency wage considerations will raise it. In the absence
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Thirdly, if all the bargaining power lies with the firm (b=0), the wage would be
determined so as to maximize the expected profits. As is shown in Appendix A,
such a profit-maximizing wage w
C has to satisfy the Solow condition xw = 1.
From (4.5) and (4.6) this condition is found to be equivalent to
, b











where Cw, Ct > 0 are defined after (3.8). This captures the situation where the firm
faces a competitive labour market. In the absence of profit sharing such a firm
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Thus, in the absence of profit sharing a firm facing a competitive labour market
would raise the wage above the unemployment benefit in order to provide
incentives for effort provision. However, according to (4.10) introduction of profit
sharing makes it possible to reduce the base wage of the workers. Consequently,
profit sharing will have base wage effects operating in an opposite direction
relative to the conventional efficiency wage considerations. In particular, for
combinations (g, t) such that g is sufficiently low and t is sufficiently high it
might happen that the base wage of the workers is reduced below the21
unemployment benefit in such a way that the expected compensation including
the profit share (adjusted to take account of the probability of bankruptcy)
equalizes the unemployment benefit b. Furthermore, from (4.10) we can conclude
that the magnitude of the effect introduced by profit sharing will be affected by
the leverage rate of the firm.
5 Leverage and profit sharing
In the long run the firm can determine its capital structure as well as the nature of
the incentive scheme, in particular the profit share, offered to the organized
workers. These decisions serve as strategic commitments relative to the
subsequent stage of wage negotiations with the union. In what follows we
consider the firm’s optimal determination of capital structure and profit sharing
system conditional on the subsequent equilibrium with respect to employment and
effort decisions and conditional on the Nash wage bargaining.
7
At this stage the firm decides on the profit share, t, and on the capital
structure,  d, in order to solve the optimization problem
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in anticipation of the bargaining outcome whereby w = w
N(..., t, d) as implicitly
given in the Nash bargaining solution (4.5). The optimal combination of profit





























for t = t* and d = d*, respectively, where at > 0 and 
N wt ,  0 w
N < d . The first-order
condition (5.2) exhibits that the optimal profit share is implicitly determined so
that the negative dilution effect is exactly counterbalanced by the positive effort-
increasing incentive and wage-moderating effects. The optimal capital structure,
                                                
7 Harris and Raviv (1991) have provided a comprehensive survey of capital structure theories and
available empirical evidence. These theories of capital structure are based on agency costs,
asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations. It
is of particular relevance from the point of view of our analysis to observe that Harris and Raviv
say that “capital structure models based product/input market interactions are in their infancy”
(Harris and Raviv 1991, p. 319). More recently, Hart (1995) has surveyed an alternative and
complementary approach of the incomplete contracting to understand firms’ financial decisions,
and in particular the nature and implications of debt and equity as financial instruments.
8 For the details of how to derive the first-order conditions (4.10) and (5.1) we refer to Appendix
B.22
in its turn, is implicitly determined by (5.3) so that the elasticity of the wage-
moderating effect with respect to the leverage rate is equal to the ratio –rd/(1+rd).
We summarize our findings regarding the firm’s optimal selection of profit
share and capital structure by




HIIHFW LQ HTXLOLEULXP )RU D JLYHQ SURILW VKDUH D KLJKHU
OHYHUDJHUDWHE\WKHILUPPRGHUDWHVWKHZDJHUDWH
The optimality conditions (5.2) and (5.3) highlight a number of interesting
features of performance-based evaluation in the form of profit sharing and capital
structure as strategic instruments for a firm facing a union in wage negotiations. In
the absence of performance-based profit sharing there would be no strategic
reason for the firm to make use of debt financing. Namely, if t = 0 there would be
no wage-moderating effect of debt financing simply because then an increase in
the firm’s leverage would only raise the effective wage cost of labor, w(1+rd), by
wr. Consequently, we can conclude from (5.3) that in our framework the optimal
leverage rate would be zero in the absence of a profit-sharing system.
9 In fact,
debt financing offers a stronger strategic instrument the higher is the profit share
offered to the union.
As an increase in the leverage rate (like the interest rate) will have a
moderating effect on the negotiated base wage it follows that it will increase the
optimal profit share. Consequently, as strategic commitment devices designed to
shift rents from the union to the firm the leverage rate and the profit share
represent complementary instruments.
Earlier, in section 3, when we derived the optimal employment decision (3.7),
we observed that labour demand depends negatively on the effective labour cost,
including the wage rate, the interest rate as well as the leverage rate and the
hazard rate, while it is positively related to the effort provision. Now after having
carried out the analysis we are ready to discuss the total employment effect of
various variables. First, profit sharing will increase employment through its wage
moderating effect, and this effect is reinforced by higher effort provision. Our
finding of a positive employment effect of profit sharing lies in line with Jerger
and Michaelis (1999).
10 As for the total employment effect of the leverage rate as
well as the interest rate, there are three mechanisms. Firstly, employment is
negatively affected by an increase in these variables as such an increase directly
raise the effective labour cost. This direct effect is offset by an effort-enhancing
effect, and by a wage-moderating effect. Both of these effects will increase
employment. As a summarizing conclusion we can observe that profit sharing
serves as an employment-enhancing instrument, while the sum of the negative
                                                
9 Of course, the firm might have no other alternative than to seek debt financing in case it faces
financial constraints. However, our present analysis with its emphasis on the strategic commitment
value of debt in relationship to the wage negotiations has not focused on financially constrainted
firms.
10 In contrast to our approach they focus on an environment with no uncertainty. Further they
abstract from capital structure as well as from efficiency wages, but introduce capital stock
decisions.23
direct and positive indirect effects for employment of changes in the interest rate
and the leverage rate are ambiguous.
Earlier we discussed existing empirical evidence concerning the employment
effect of leverage and found that it lies in conformity with our specification of
employment determination (3.7). It is an area for further empirical research to
evaluate also the potential effects of interest rates and profit sharing on
employment, ceteris paribus. As for the impact of these factors on wage
determination, Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) conducted an econometric study
using panel data on a large number of UK companies. This study produced
evidence according to which the leverage rate will have a negative effect on the
wage determination, ceteris paribus. This finding lies in conformity with our
analysis presented in section 4. An area for further empircal research is to test for
the potential role of the interest rate as well as profit sharing in the wage
formation.
6 Profit shares: commitment versus bargaining
A few contributions to the literature on wage bargaining, for example Jerger and
Michaelis (1999), Holmlund (1991), Pohjola (1987) and Anderson and Devereux
(1989), have analyzed profit sharing within a framework where the union-firm
negotiations include profit shares in addition to base wages. In this literature the
profit shares are determined at the stage of bargaining simultaneously with base
wages, a feature which can be questioned on grounds of realism.
11 Further, as
emphasized by Jerger and Michaelis (1999), incorporation of the profit sharing
instrument at the stage of union-firm bargaining implicitly means that the union
has a right to strike for a higher share of the firm’s profits in case an agreement is
not reached. Such a feature, however, seems to contradict the legal framework
according to which the property rights for profits are with the firm. For these
reasons we have assumed that the firm irreversibly commits itself to an incentive
scheme, a profit-sharing system, prior to the stage of wage bargaining.
Nevertheless it is interesting and enlightening to ask: What difference does it
make that the firm commits itself to a profit sharing system prior to bargaining
relative to a situation, where the profit share would be determined at the
bargaining stage simultaneously with the wage determination?
In order to carry out this comparison we have to characterize the profit share
which solves the following Nash bargaining problem
[] [ ] . E ) 1 ( EU max
1 b - b
t p t - = W
The Nash bargaining solution with respect to the profit share has to satisfy the
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11 At least the authors are not aware of cases where the nature of the incentive scheme offered to
unionized workers would have been subject to negotiations with unions within the framework of
collective bargaining.24
By substituting (C1) and (C4) from Appendix C into the first-order condition (6.1)
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= x . In general, (6.2) does not lend itself to general analytical solutions,
which could be expressed in a way so as to make economic interpretations
possible.
12 For that reason we will restrict ourselves to a characterization of the
Nash bargaining profit share for the particular case where all the bargaining power
lies with the firm. As noticed above, this special case is sufficiently interesting in
order to clarify the role played by the firm’s commitment to a profit-sharing
system.










Thus, with all the bargaining power concentrated to the firm the outcome of the
bargaining process would be t
C = 0 in the absence of effort-inducing
considerations (xt = 0). When profit shares have effort-enhancing effects we can
conclude from (6.3) that the bargaining outcome incorporates positive profit
shares and that this outcome is an increasing function of the magnitude of these
effort-enhancing effects.
In order to clarify the implications of the firm’s commitment with respect to




















C and t* we can directly conclude that the relationship
C * t > t (6.4)
holds. In fact, even in the absence of a wage-moderating effect of profit sharing
the ordering (6.4) holds true. The presence of wage-moderating effects reinforces
this ordering.
In light of the arguments presented above we can conclude
                                                
12 Even if the difficulties induced by the fairly complicated expressions for xt and h* were





Intuitively, the optimal profit share is higher under commitment than when it is
determined at the stage of bargaining, because when optimally committing itself
to a profit sharing system the effort-enhancing considerations will be given a
higher weight. In addition, the commitment is typically associated with a wage-
moderating effect, which will, of course, not be present, when the profit share is
determined at the stage of bargaining simultaneously with the wage
determination. Also this additional effect raises the profit share under the
commitment regime relative to that determined through bargaining.
7 Aggregate wage setting and equilibrium
unemployment
So far our analysis has been restricted to a partial equilibrium perspective. In this
section we will outline the implications of profit sharing, union bargaining power,
leverage and the benefit-replacement ratio on equilibrium unemployment in a
general equilibrium sense.
Until now our analysis of wage bargaining has referred to a representative
industry, say i. By (4.5), for each representative industry the generalized Nash
bargaining solution has the implicit form
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and where the variables on the RHS are industry-specific. However, for simplicity
we have abstracted from industry-specific notation. In fact, (7.1) in the absence of
efficiency wage considerations (xw = 0) the relationship between the base wage
and the outside option is linear with
.
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We assume that yi = y, i.e. that all the industries are identical in the sense of firms
negotiating with unions having identical bargaining power and facing identical
elasticity of labour demand, identical profits shares, capital structures as well as
interest rates. In a general equilibrium context the term b should be re-interpreted
to be the outside option. With this interpretation the outside option is given by
, uB w ) u 1 ( b + - = (7.3)26
where u denotes the unemployment rate, B the unemployment benefit and w
N is
the negotiated wage rate in all the identical industries (for a standard justification
we refer to, for example, Layard et al. (1991), p. 100–101). We follow Jerger and
Michaelis (1999) in so far as we further restrict ourselves to the case of a constant
replacement ratio q º B/w
N.
Combining (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3) we find that the aggregate unemployment
rate can be expressed according to
[]
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From (7.4) we can conclude that our model offers fairly detailed insights
regarding the determination of aggregate unemployment. We can formulate these
insights in
3URSRVLWLRQ ,QWKHDEVHQFHRIHIILFLHQF\ZDJHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVWKHDJJUHJDWH
XQHPSOR\PHQW UDWH GHSHQGV SRVLWLYHO\ RQ WKH UHODWLYH




The properties incorporated in Proposition 5 all appeal to intuition. It is
particularly interesting to observe that our model lends support to the view of
profit sharing as a policy instrument with the effect of reducing the aggregate
unemployment rate. This employment-enhancing effect of profit sharing can be
seen as a consequence of its wage-moderating effect. The similar result have been
established in different models by Holmlund (1991) and by Jerger and Michaelis
(1999).
When placing into perspective that the leverage rate would reduce the
unemployment rate, it should be remembered that our model incorporates neither
imperfections in the product market nor optimizing behaviour by the institutions
operating in the credit market. If the product market is imperfectly competitive,
the firm’s leverage can be expected to affect the mark-ups positively and thereby
to increase equilibrium unemployment. We have excluded effects whereby an
increased leverage rate would generate higher interest rates, which can be
expected both to reduce investment and to increase mark-ups.
13 Consequently, the
employment-enhancing effect of leverage (or interest rate) is simply a reflection
of the labour market effect according to which an increased leverage rate will
induce a wage moderation at the bargaining stage.
                                                
13 For a detailed theoretical argument and some empirical evidence from USA, see Chevalier and
Scharfstein (1996). Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) provide empirical evidence from Finland for
the positive relationship between the mark-ups and the firm’s leverage. Phelps (1994) has argued
that higher interest rates can be expected to increase mark-ups by shortening the effective planning
horizon of firms.27
8 Concluding comments
This study has offered a unified framework for simultaneously analyzing the
determination of employment, effort provided by employed union members,
wages, profit sharing as well as capital structure under uncertainty generated by a
stochastic revenue shock. The following time sequence of decisions was
postulated: At stage 1 the firm commits itself to a profit sharing scheme and to a
leverage rate, at stage 2 there is union-firm wage bargaining, and at stage 3
employment is unilaterally determined by the firm and effort by the employee
before the resolution of the stochastic revenue shock.
We initially showed that employment depends negatively on the effective
labour cost as well as on the hazard rate capturing the uncertainty associated with
the firm’s production. The effective labour cost consists not only of the wage rate,
but it also incorporates the interest rate and, importantly, the firm’s rate of
leverage. Further, the effort provision by union members was shown to depend
positively not only on the usual efficiency wage considerations, but we also
characterized the effort-enhancing effects of profit sharing.
Wage determination was analyzed by applying a generalized Nash bargaining
solution, which extended the wage bargaining literature by incorporating not only
efficiency wage considerations in the presence of uncertainty, but also profit
sharing and capital structure. From the generalized bargaining solution we were
able to conclude how capital structure and performance-based evaluation in the
form of profit sharing will have a strategic wage-moderating commitment value
for a firm facing a union in wage negotiations.
We also derived the optimal profit sharing system and the optimal capital
structure from the firm’s point of view. The profit sharing instrument was
demonstrated to have positive effort-augmenting and wage-moderating effects,
which exactly offset the negative dilution effect at the optimal profit share. The
mechanism was established whereby a higher leverage rate not only increases the
effective labour cost, but also moderates the wage rate, which is a crucial feature
for determining the firm’s optimal capital structure. The paper ended with a brief
characterization of the implications of profit sharing, bargaining power, the
benefit-replacement ratio and the firm’s leverage on equilibrium unemployed
from a general equilibrium perspective.
Our model offered support in favor of the employment-enhancing effects of
profit sharing systems. Profit sharing increases employment via its wage-
moderating effect, and this effect is further reinforced by profit-sharing systems
inducing higher effort provision. For an overall evaluation of the total
employment effects of the degree of leverage and of the interest rate our study
identified three channels. Employment was established to be discouraged through
the direct effect of these variables increasing the effective labour cost. This direct
effect, however, was shown to be offset both by higher effort provision and by
wage moderation, both effects of which have employment-encouraging effect.
Though there is empirical evidence on the determinants of employment and
wages, which lies in conformity with our findings, it still remains an important
task for future research to evaluate the interactions between wages, employment
and financial factors more systematically than what has been done thus far. Our
analysis highlighted the role of capital structure and performance-based
evaluation in the form of profit sharing as strategic commitment devices designed28
to shift rents from the union to the firm as strategic instruments for a firm facing a
union in wage negotiations. The leverage rate and the profit share were shown to
typically represent complementary instruments in this respect.
Throughout the analysis we have assumed that firms make use of profit
sharing as a commitment device. Of course, it might be the case that firms decide
on profit sharing after knowing the result of the wage negotiation. It is easy to
convince oneself that the optimal capital structure derived within our framework
would survive such an alteration in the timing of decisions.
In our analysis the union was assumed to be able to enforce the effort
provision by the representative union member, which was justified through our
focus on homogenous labour force so that agency issues within unions do not
arise. It is left for further research to relax this assumption and incorporate the
additional aspect arising from potential free rider effects among the organized
employees. However, the principal-agent literature has not yet been developed to
cover agents with bargaining power and an analysis of group punishments or
reward schemes in the presence of union bargaining power would require one
further step.29
Appendix 1
Derivation of the Nash bargaining wage rate
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response by the firm to a change in the wage rate. The optimal employment
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w = x . In particular, we can observe that if the firm could
unilaterally decide on w so as to maximize its expected profit such a profit-
maximizing wage would satisfy that xw = 1, which is the well-known “Solow
condition” for the efficiency wage determination in the absence of wage
bargaining.
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As for the trade union side we find that by combination of (4.2) and (4.3’) the
expected rent of the union can be expressed as
[] . b )) r 1 ( kc 1 ( w L EU - d + t + = (A1.2)
By differentiating equation (4.2) with respect to w we obtain
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Determination of the optimal capital structure and profit
sharing
By differentiation of the expected profit function (5.1) with respect to t we find
the necessary first-order condition to be given by
. 0 ) 1 ( Lw ) r 1 ( k ) 1 ( La ) aL ( k E E
1 = t - d + - t - + p - = p t t
- a
t (A2.1)
(A2.1) shows that there is an interior optimal profit share, which is determined so
that the negative dilution effect is exactly offset by the positive effects of
increased effort and a moderated wage rate on the expected profits of the firm.
Remembering that the expected profit can be written by (4.3’) and that the optimal
employment decision of the firm is equivalent to the condition
a
) 1 ( ) r 1 ( w
) aL (
1 a - l d +
=
- a  it follows that (A2.1) can be rewritten according to
(5.2).
Differentiation of (5.1) with respect to d directly yields the first-order
condition
, 0 Lwr ) 1 ( k w ) r 1 ( L ) 1 ( k E = t - - d + t - - = p d d (A2.2)
which can be reformulated so that the interior optimal capital structure is
determined by (5.3).32
Appendix 3
Derivation of the Nash bargaining profit share
This appendix develops the expressions for the terms 
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order condition (6.1) of the Nash bargaining. We start by looking at the reactions
of the firm to a change in the profit share. The optimal employment decision of
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As for the trade union side we find that by combination of (4.2) and (4.3’) the
expected rent of the union can be expressed as
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